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106 PEOPLE v. MARTIN [46 C.2d 
default and the thereon was void. ( Castagnoli 
124 Cal.App.2d 39, 41 [268 P.2d 37].) 
The order is reversed. 
\TlLJ,.,,Ju. C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
petition for a rehearing was denied :F'ebruary 
1956. 
[Crim. No. 5758. In Bank. Feb. 3, 1956.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. GEORGE H. MARTIN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justification For.-The presence of 
two men in a parked automobile on a lover's lane at night 
is itself reasonable cause for police investigation, and their 
sudden flight from the officers and the inference therefrom 
that they are guilty of some crime leaves no doubt as to the 
reasonableness and necessity for an investigation, and under 
such circumstances it is reasonable for the officers to order 
the suspects to put their hands in front of them and to get 
out of an automobile to be searched before being questioned. 
[2] !d.-Justification For.-Where officers had reasonable ground 
to pursue suspects and, on overtaking them, to order them to 
put their hands in front of them, whereupon one officer saw 
a small bag in the front seat of an automobile which had been 
covered by their hands, he had reasonable cause to believe 
that their possession of it prompted their flight and that it 
contained contraband, and was therefore justified in taking 
it from the car. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County and from an order denying a new trial. Donald 
K. Quayle, Judge. Judgment affirmed; appeal from order 
dismissed. 
Prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment 
of conviction affirmed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 







































PEOPI,E V. MARTIN 
r 46 C.2d 106; 293 P.2d 521 
IL Martin, in 
appointment by the 
107 
G. Brown, Attorney Clarence A. J~inn, 
Attorney General, and Arlo E. 
Attorney General, for Hespondent. 
J.-Defendant appeals from a of 
entered on a jury verdict him guilty of 
one count of possessing marijuana in violation of Health and 
Code, section 11500. He also appeals from an order 
that he claims was entered denying his motion for a new 
The record, however, does not disclose that a motion 
new trial was made or that an order denying it was 
The latter appeal must therefore be dismissed. 
Offieers MeCann and Price of the Oakland Poliee Depart-
ment were on automobile patrol duty during the evening of 
.Jnly 1954. At about 11 o'elock, while driving in a south-
erly direction on Poplar Street near 21st Street, they observed 
a car parked on the opposite side of the street headed in 
tlH~ opposite direction. As they passed the car, Officer 
::\IcCaun turned his spotlight on it and saw two men sitting 
in the front seat. He testified: ''. . . it is a lover's lane. 
If had been a female and a male I wouldn't have thought 
too much of it bnt two males in that vicinity I figured we 
had better check it out and a:> I brought the patrol car around 
to make a U -turn on Poplar Street the sm;pects' car took 
off. spun their wheels taking off at a high rate of speed. 
turned right onto 21st Street and proceeded up 21st 
Street and turned right again on Union Street which wonld 
put them heading in a southern direction again on Union 
Strert and they turned east on 19th Street and all this time 
I had the red light and siren on and I brought the patrol 
car np there on their left rear and very close and stopped 
them in front of 1181 - 19th Street.'' Officer McCann ap-
the car from the left, and Officer Price from the 
right, and one of them flashed his flashlight into the car. 
Robel't Dial, who later pleaded gnilty to the charge of posses-
marijuana, was in the <1riv<'r's seaL Defendant waR 
on tlte right-hand side of the front :seaL Dial's right 
hand and defendant's ldt hand wet'r• on the cr'uter of the 
seaL The offieers ordt>red the ~n"pel'ts to tbeir lwtHb 
m of them, and wlwn ilwy did so Officer McCa 11 n saw 
a small bag in the middle of the front seat that had been 
covered by their hands. The officers ordered the suspects 
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out of the car, and after searching them for weapons Officer 
McCann reached into the car and took the bag. He examined 
it and concluded that it contained Later analysis 
confirmed this conclusion. 
Defendant contends that the search of the automobile 
a warrant was unlawful and that the evidence pro-
was therefore inadmissible. 
[1] the presence of two men in a parked auto-
mobile on a lover's lane at was itself reasonable cause 
for People v. Simon, 45 Oal.2d 645, 
649-651 ; Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.App. 
13, 16-17 ) , their sudden flight from the officers 
and the inference that could reasonably be drawn therefrom 
that were guilty of some crime (United States v. Heitner, 
149 F .2d 105, 107), left no doubt not only as to the reason-
ableness but as to the necessity for an investigation. (Husty 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 [51 S.Ct. 240, 75 
L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407]; Talley v. United States, 159 
F.2d 703; Levine v. United States, 138 F.2d 627, 628-629; 
Jones v. United States, 131 F.2d 539, 541.) Under these 
circumstances the officers were justified in taking precau-
tionary measures to assure their own safety on overtaking 
the suspects, and it was therefore reasonable for them to 
order the suspects to put their hands in front of them and 
to get out of the automobile to be searched for weapons before 
being questioned. [2] When Officer McCann saw the bag 
that was uncovered when the suspects removed their hands, 
he had reasonable cause to believe that their possession of it 
prompted the flight and that it contained contraband. He 
was therefore justified in taking it from the automobile. 
(Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 [ 45 S.Ot. 280, 
69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790] ; Husty v. United States, supra, 
282 U.S. 694, 700-701; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 
255 [59 S.Ot. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151] ; Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 165-171 [69 S.Ot. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879]; United 
States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Automobile, 167 F.2d 
3, 7.) 
The judgment is affirmed, and the appeal from an alleged 
order denying a motion for new trial is dismissed. 
Gibson, 0. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and 
McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
It appears to me that the following statement from the 
majority opinion is most astounding: ''Although the pres-
when bas there been a curfew for adults? Since when 
been illegal for two men to converse at 
? Since the 
rooms, private homes and offices and 
has become so prevalent, almost the 
ueOi:omcu, who wish their conversation to remain private, can 
is in an automobile on a sparsely traveled street or 
secluded place. And, if their mere presence in a parked 
is held to warrant police investigation, it appears 
that private conversations must also be held illegal and the 
of privacy nonexistent. 
must be remembered that the F'ourth Amendment to 
Constitution of the United States was adopted for the 
of all of the people of this country, and that 
19 of article I of the Constitution of California was 
for the protection of all of the people of this state. 
object and purpose of the framers of these constitutional 
mandates was to guarantee and make secure the fundamental 
of privacy to every person-the right to be secure 
police surveillance unless the police have reasonable 
to believe that an offense is being committed. This 
does not mean mere suspicion as some of our courts have 
indicated. The obvious reason for the rule that 
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal searcll, cannot 
be against the victim of the search, is to protect innocent 
by discouraging such searches. It is a matter of com-
mon knowledge that it has been the practice of law enforce-
ment officers of this state to make searches of the persons 
and property of individuals whenever they saw fit regardless 
of whether reasonable or any cause existed, and many inno-
people have been subjected to the indignity and humilia-
tion of having their persons, homes, offices and automobiles 
searched by law enforcement officers with impunity when 
of an ineriminating nature was found and no arrests 
or prosecutions resulted therefrom. Many of these invasions 
of the constitutional right of privaey received no public 
mention because the victims did not wish to incur the expense 
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and •·ndnre the ineonvenic-ncP and publicity incidental to 
redress in the eonrts. It is probable that for every 
case where evidence of a crime has been found there have 
been numerous searches whieh uneovered no evidence 
and we know from the reported cases that the 
of illegal searches in this state has increased many 
fold in recent years. The American way of life does not 
lend itself to such totalitarian practices. There is no place 
in our body politic for the Gestapo, the storm trooper or the 
commissar. Ours is a system of ordered liberty which is 
made more secure placing a magistrate between the citizens 
and the overzealous law enforcement officer. ·while this 
system must the guilty as well as the innocent against 
an unlawful search and seizure, its effect on criminal prosecu-
tions in this field is no different than any of the other safe-
guards embraced in the Bill of Rights which are designed 
to protect the life, liberty and property of our people against 
deprivation without due process of law. Each and every one 
of these safeguards operates as an impediment against the 
conviction of the guilty as well as the innocent. Yet, this 
is necessary in any system of ordered liberty. If the above 
mentioned constitutional provisions have any meaning what-
soever, then the victim of an illegal search may assert the 
right of privacy guaranteed to him and resist such search. 
If he does so, either he or the officer may be injured or killed. 
If this should occur, where should the blame fall T Obviously, 
a prosecutor who favors such illegal conduct on the part of 
law enforcement officers would be disposed to prosecute the 
victim of the illegal search if he should injure or kill the 
officer in his effort to resist the search, and would not pros-
ecute the officer who injured or killed the victim in the 
forcible execution of his illegal project. 
From the intemperate and misleading statements appear-
ing in the public press recently as having been made by heads 
of police departments and prosecuting officers of this state 
against the rule in the Cahan case, we are forced to assume 
that they feel that great credit and high praise should go 
to those law enforcing officers who ruthlessly violate the above 
mentioned constitutional guarantees, and that hatred, con-
tempt, ridicule and obloquy should be heaped upon those 
who insist upon their observance and preservation. I will 
again repeat what I have said many times both as a private 
citizen and as a public official of this state, that I have a 
sincere devotion to the American system for the administra-
tion of justice as postulated by the Constitution of the United 
PEOPLE v. J'vLmnN 
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S1 and the Bill of Rights that I can coneeive of no 
eJ11ergency short of a threat to our national which 
justify striking down any of the for the 
of the rights of the people cmbraeed within that 
'fhe impediments against law the 
eseur1e of some criminals from convietion and 
·the cost to the public incidental to the 
stem, fades into insignificance when we offset and balanee 
those factors the glorious feeling wll ieh stems from 
the eonsciousness that, because of this we live in an 
where we may enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness with dignity and ,;elf-respect, secure against 
anv invasion of our fundamental personal rights without 
du~ nrocess of law. · 
elder Pitt, in his speech on the l<jxeise 'l'ax, gave 
to what later became the B'ourth Amendment. 
\Ylwt he said then is just as important today. He said that 
"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the 
forvrs of the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the 
,dnds may blow throug-h it; tll(• ~tonus may enter; the rain 
ma.v enter-hut the King of England cannot enter. All his 
forC',:s eannot cross the threshold of the rnitwd tenement." 
Yd. prior to the decision in the Cahan case, the police and 
otlu•r so-ealled law enforcement officers in California could 
force their way into the home of a private eitizen, 
anrl without a sr'arch warrant, seize whatever they found and 
nse Jt as evidenee in onr courts notwithstanding they violated 
the coJJstitutional right-the right of privaey-of the citizen 
in obtaining it. 
Another great Englishman, I .. ord Coke, had this to say 
on J his same subject: "The house of everyone is to him as his 
castln and fortrrss, as wrll for his defrnse against injury and 
1·ioknee as for his repose.'' 
Jnr. ,Justice Holmes, in his great dissent in OlmstearZ Y. 
United States, 277 TJ.S. 488, 469, 470 f48 S.Ct. G64, 72 I.~.Ed. 
944, nG A.L.R 376], had this to say: "But I think, as Mr . 
. Jnslin; Brandei:;; says, that apart from the (;onstitntion the 
goy,•rmnfmt oug-ht not to nse evidence obtained am1 only ob-
tainable by a r·riminal act .... ['VVle m11st eonsidr·r the two 
of rlesire, both of whieh wr; eH!liJOt have anrl mal<e 
up rm mimlR ·whir•h to ehoose. Tt is rtesir<JlJle that criminals 
should be rleteet.erl, ;u](lio that end that all availnhle nvidem·e 
shonld b0 nsed. It also is r1PRirable that the g·overnmcnt 
Rhonl,l not itsPJf foster atHl pa.v for other r~rimes. when they 
-
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which the evidence is to be obtained. I:f 
officers for got evidence by crime I do 
may not as well pay them for getting it in the 
and I can attach no importance to protestations of 
if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces 
in future it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, 
and my I think a less ev,il that some criminals 
shmtld escape than that the shottld play an 
I am in full accord with the views expressed by Mr. Justice 
in People v. 45 Cal.2d 645, 650 [290 P.2d 
531], where he said: "In the present case the officer searched 
first and asked questions only after his search uncovered the 
incriminating cigarette, and there is nothing to indicate that 
had he confined himself to a reasonable inquiry, he would 
have discovered anything to confirm his suspicion that de. 
fendant had no lawful right to be where he was. 
"Under these circumstances, to permit an officer to justify 
a search on the ground that he 'didn't feel' that a person 
on the street at night had any lawful business there would 
expose anyone to having his person searched by any suspicious 
officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions were. Inno-
cent people, going to or from evening jobs or entertainment, 
or walking for exercise or enjoyment, would suffer along with 
the occasional criminal who would be turned up. As pointed 
out by Mr. Justice Jackson in a similar case, 'We meet in this 
case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is said that if 
such arrests and searches cannot be made, law enforcement 
will be more difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers, 
after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Con-
stitution to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating 
police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater 
danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals 
from punishment. Taking the law as it has been given to us, 
this arrest and search were beyond the lawful authority of 
those who executed them.' (United States v. Di Re, supra, 
332 U.S. 581,595 [68 S.Ct. 222,92 L.Ed. 210].)" (Emphasis 
added.) In Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.App. 13, 16, 17 [98 P. 
43], the court said: ''A police officer has a right to make 
inquiry in a pt·oper manner of anyone upon the public streets 
at a late hour as to his identity and the occasion of his pres-
ence, if the surroundings are suck as to indicate to a reasonable 
man that the pttblic safety demands such identification. The 
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1 1 :.l 
ntif'f: at late hour was found in the 
refused to answer proper questions estab-
his , were circumstances which should lead a 
officer to his presence at the station, where 
might make more minute and careful 
added.) Here, even after the chase, the 
were ordered to put their 
and ordered to out of the car. 
that the very sight of the two men 
car justified a police investigation, the majority 
on their flight from the officers. In United States v. 
, 149 F.2d 105, lOG, the officers involved had been 
police headquarters to watch a certain building 
\Yas suspected a still was being operated. Two men 
out of the building and 1vere followed by the officers 
them. They went back to the building and the 
or flight, ensued when the tiro men returned there. 
obvious from a reading of the case that the facts there 
more than the presence of two men in a car to warrant 
tl1e "earch. In Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 [51 
75 r_...Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407], the facts showed 
that on the day of petitioner's arrest, the officer had re-
information that Husty had two loads of liquor in 
described automobiles which were parked in "par-
places on named streets.'' The court held that the 
inf,;;·mation received prior to the arrest was sufficient to show 
ble cause for the arrest. In the instant case, we have 
fact that two men were parked in an automobile at 
n and their flight from the investigating officers to estab-
lish probable cause. In Talley v. United States, 159 F.2c1 703, 
the eourt noted that "there was advance information suffi-
itself to justify the search. But, more than that, 
was actual evidence of conduct, ineluding flight, trans-
in the presence of the officers" to justify their search. 
v. United States, 138 F.2d 627, there was also ad-
reliable information that the appellant had illegal 
of alcohol prior to the search by the officers. In 
United States, 131 F.2d 539, probable cause for the 
was found to exist because the officers had kept the 
aef·nst•d premisf'S nnder surveillanee for about three months 
thereto. 
the 1mmmary set forth above of the cases relied on 
majority it appears that they are readily distinguish-
ablr. In all of them there was advance information that 
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a crime was being committed together with flight from law 
enforcement officers. In the instant case there was only the 
sight of two men in a parked car and their flight after the 
police started their investigation. In People v. Brown, 45 
Cal.2d 640 [290 P.2d 528], we held that a search incident 
to an arrest could not be justified in the absence of reasonable 
cause under section 836 of the Penal Code merely because it 
revealed that defendant was in fact guilty of a felony. 
(People v. Simon, 45 Cal.2d 645, 648 [290 P.2d 531].) 
There was, therefore, under the facts here present no reason-
able cause to justify the search and the evidence was inad-
missible. (People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905].) 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
[Crim. No. 5759. In Bank. Feb. 3, 1956.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ERNEST BLODGETT 
[DON WILLIAMS], Appellant. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-A search of a cab 
cannot be justified on the ground that the cab driver could 
have been arrested for double parking, >Iince it has no relation 
to the traffic violation and would not be incidental to an arrest 
therefor. 
[2] Arrest--Without Warrant.-There is nothing unreasonable in 
an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night, or in order-
ing them out of a cab for questioning at night where their 
unusual conduct warrants it. 
[3] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-Where an officer, 
who had reasonable grounds for ordering suspects from a cab 
for questioning, saw defendant's furtive action in withdrawing 
his left hand from behind the seat at the juncture of the seat 
and back cushion, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe 
that defendant was hiding contraband, and a search of the 
cab was reasonable. 
[4a, 4b] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for illegal possession 
of marijuana, misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in at-
tempting to suggest to the jury that defendant had taken 
heroin the evening before his arrest did not constitute ground 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 52 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [2] 
Arrest, § 5; [4] Criminal Law, § 1404(6); Witnesses, § 100. 
